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ABSTRACT 
In the last three years, there has been a great deal of turbulence in U.S. defense 
acquisition policy. This has contributed to confusion within the acquisition workforce in 
terminology, major policy thrusts, and unclear implications of the changes. The new 
acquisition framework has added complexity, with more phases and delineations of 
activity, and both the number and level of decision reviews have been increased. Decision 
reviews are used as top management level project control gates, and are also a feature of 
centralized control within a bureaucracy. Although the current stated policy is to foster an 
environment supporting flexibility and innovation, the result is a continuous cycle of 
decision reviews. Program Managers may now have fewer resources to manage their 
programs as they spend much of their time, and budgets, managing the bureaucracy. 
Moreover, the implicit aspects of the still new model have not been fully realized, and may 
result in policy that actually lengthens programs -- counter to goals of rapid 
transformation. The framework, and its associated requirements for senior level reviews, 
are opposed to the rapid and evolutionary policy espoused, and are counter to appropriate 
management strategies for a transformational era.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The issuance of Department of Defense Directive 5000.1
1
 and Instruction 5000.2
2
 on 
May 12, 2003, is the third significant revision of acquisition policy in as many years. 
Looking further back, these three revisions of regulatory guidance had evolved from two 
previous versions in 1991
3
 and 1996.
4
 Each had its major thrusts and tenets, and perhaps 
of most importance to Program Managers, modifications to the “Defense Systems 
Acquisition Management Process”
5
 or “Defense Acquisition Framework”
6
 which is the 
broad paradigm of phases and milestone reviews in the life of an acquisition program.  
The purpose of this author’s research was to examine the evolution of this framework and 
elucidate the explicit and implicit aspects of recent changes to the model to better 
understand its current form. Provided here is a synopsis of the most important findings.  
The full report of this research, examining both private industry and defense acquisition 
decision models is available at:  
http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/publications/FY03/AM-03-003.pdf  
The very latest DoD 5000 policy changes have come during a time of DoD 
Transformation, which, while greater in scope than solely equipment and technology, is 
chiefly focused on changes to force structure and weapons employment capabilities. This 
latest version of the 5000 series was actually drafted in the documents rescinding its 
predecessor. According to his memorandum signed on October 30, 2002, Deputy 
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Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the series required revision “to create an 
acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and 
innovation” (Wolfowitz 2002). Interim guidance was issued, along with the rescission, as 
a temporary replacement, outlining principles and policies to govern the operation of the 
new Defense acquisition system.  Among them: 
3.1 Responsibility for acquisition of systems shall be decentralized to the 
maximum extent practicable. 3.18 The PM shall be the single point of 
accountability for accomplishment of program objectives for total life 
cycle systems management, including sustainment. 3.27 It shall be DoD 
policy to minimize reporting requirements.
7
 
Though the 5000 series provides guidance for all levels, or Acquisition Categories 
(ACAT), of programs, its language is particularly applicable to the largest, ACAT I, 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). In such cases, the MDA is the Defense 
Acquisition Executive, who also chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) as a 
decision-making body for program milestone reviews. There are in fact both a 
Component Acquisition Executive and Program Executive Officer in the hierarchy 
between them, and direct communication between MDA and PM is infrequent. Other top 
management stakeholders are OSD staff principals who sit in membership on the Defense 
Acquisition Board, where milestone decision reviews are conducted. Communication 
between PM and OSD staff principals is more frequent, especially via the Overarching 
Integrated Product Team process.
8
 As of this writing, there are a total of 25 MDAP 
programs in the Department of Defense. 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF DEFENSE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Defense systems in particular, known for their size and technological pursuits, are seen as 
among the most challenging of projects. Gadeken, et al. (1997), building upon previous 
studies at the Defense Systems Management College, concluded that the Project Manager 
competencies of systematic and innovative thinking were among the most needed and 
critical in order to accommodate growing complexities. 
Inherent difficulty in the management of any program is exacerbated for the DoD by 
several additional factors, which have become even more apparent in the last twenty 
years. Large defense systems are very complex systems, consisting of hardware and 
software, multiple suppliers, etc. and requiring design approaches to alleviate complexity 
via hierarchical decomposition into simpler subsets, etc. Rapid technology changes, 
yielding obsolescence, have become particularly problematic for very large systems with 
acquisition life cycles spanning a long period of time. Thus, it may not even be feasible to 
fully define the operational capabilities and functional characteristics of the entire system 
before commencing advanced development.
9 
The DoD 5000 series acknowledges these many complexities and difficulties facing 
MDAs and PMs in their management and oversight of large weapon system 
developments. An approach to mitigate these technological challenges, especially in the 
post-2000 series, is evolutionary acquisition, referred to by some outside of DoD as 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6     Issue 2  ·   2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
74 
 
progressive acquisition. Also advocated by the General Accounting Office, it has evolved 
worldwide as a concept over the past two decades. It is an incremental development 
approach, using iterative development cycles versus a single grand design. Described 
succinctly by the Western European Armaments Group (2000), the progressive 
acquisition approach is: 
…a strategy to acquire a large and complex system, which is expected to 
change over its lifecycle. The final system is obtained by upgrades of 
system capability through a series of operational increments. (It) aims to 
minimize many of the risks associated with the length and size of the 
development, as well as requirements volatility and evolution of 
technology. 
Very similar in description, DoD’s adaptation of this approach as “evolutionary 
acquisition” is a major policy thrust in the series, and is the stated “preferred approach” 
toward all new system developments. This particular policy thrust is important to this 
study as it pertains to the framework of phases and decision reviews of a program moving 
toward completion. It is meant to change the way programs are structured and products 
are delivered – actually separating projects into smaller, less ambitious increments. It is, 
additionally, one of several aspects of the new policy that affect the framework and its 
use as a management control mechanism. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL THEORY AND DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
Wideman (2002) also advocated progressive (evolutionary) acquisition, and recognized 
senior management’s responsibility for financial accountability in private and public 
projects and their preference for central control. He noted problems with senior 
management control over complex developments such as software enterprises like 
Defense Information Systems, even when projects were not very large or lengthy. His 
observations in large, complex programs align with classic contingency theory, which 
holds that organizational structures must change in response to contingencies of size, 
technology, and as external environments become more complex and dynamic. Indeed, it 
has long been accepted that when faced with uncertainty (a situation with less 
information than is needed) the management response must either be to redesign the 
organization for the task at hand, or improve communication flows and processing 
(Galbraith 1973). Gareth Morgan (1997) traced organizational theory through the past 
century and depicts organizations as a variety of images, or metaphors in his treatise, 
Images of Organization. He warns that large hierarchical, mechanistic organizational 
forms have difficulty adapting to change and are not designed for innovation. Further 
research by Burrell and Morgan indicate that any incongruence among management 
processes and the organization’s environment tend to reduce organizational efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
In figure 1 below, an organization shown as “D” is illustrated as having incongruent 
relations between its organizational subsystems. Morgan’s organizational development 
research, in accord with the conclusions of contingency theory, makes a strong case for 
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consistency and compatibility between these internal subsystems and changing external 
environmental circumstances. He warns that such an organization is over bureaucratized 
in its management style and will find difficulty sustaining its competitive position. He 
recommends organizations be designed and managed more like organizations “A, B or 
C” which are greater in alignment along the continuum of stable to turbulent 
environments (Morgan 1997).
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Congruence and Incongruence Between Organizational Subsystems. Adapted 
from Burrell and Morgan (1979: 177). 
 
In their book, The Intelligent Organization, Gifford & Elizabeth Pinchot (1993) make 
an even stronger case for decentralized management in large complex organizations faced 
with transformational change. They suggest that as organizations today face increasing 
complexity, rapidity of change, distributed information, and new forms of competition, 
organizations must grow more intelligent to confront and defeat the diverse and 
simultaneous challenges. They posit that for an organization to be fully intelligent, it 
must use the intelligence of its members all the way down the hierarchy. They note that 
with distributed information there is distributed intelligence, and failure to render 
authority to those closest to the problem will yield lethargy, mediocre performance, or 
worse – paralysis. Control will be maintained, and anarchy will not occur -- but neither 
will succeed. 
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What the cumulative research appears to support is that, for large complex hierarchies 
such as the Department of Defense, decentralized control and empowerment should be an 
organizational strength, given today’s environment of program complexity, evolving 
requirements, and rapidly changing technology. 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT LIFE CYCLEMODELS 
Models have long been used to illustrate the integration of functional efforts across the 
timeline of a project or program. It is the successful integration of these diverse elements 
that is the very essence of project management. Models also help us to visualize the total 
scope of a project and “see” its division into phases and decision points. The interaction 
and overlapping of many and varied activities such as planning, engineering, test and 
evaluation, logistics, manufacturing, etc. must be adroitly managed for optimum 
attainment of project cost, schedule and technical performance outcomes. The Project 
Management Institute’s Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®) provides 
generally accepted knowledge and practices in the broad field of project management. 
Striving for commonality across diverse business areas and product commodities, it 
provides a generic framework as a structure for understanding the management of a 
project or program. In figure 2 below, a project life cycle is depicted as costs and staffing 
relative to time. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample Generic Project Life Cycle, adapted from PMBOK® 2000. 
 
Project Management difficulty climbs along a scale of system complexity and 
technological uncertainty, and is also simplified by division of the effort into phases, with 
points between for management review and decision.  The conclusion of a project phase 
is generally marked by a review of both key deliverables and project performance in 
order to: (a) determine if the project should continue into its next phase; and, (b) detect 
and correct errors cost effectively. These phase-end reviews are often called phase exits, 
stage gates, control gates, or kill points.
10
 The institute acknowledges a variety of 
approaches to modeling project life cycles, with some so detailed that they actually 
become management methodologies. Further, the illustration of generic project 
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management processes or activities across time are depicted in figure 3 below, in order to 
convey another tenet of project management – the concurrency of efforts to minimize 
project schedule. 
 
 
Figure 3. Project Management Processes, adapted from PMBOK® 2000.
11
 
 
THE EVOLVING DEFENSE ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK 
The 1996 Model: Models of program structure are important to the Department of Defense in 
communicating the overall acquisition strategy of a large acquisition project.  The 1996 revision 
of the 5000 series was published after a rigorous effort to reform the defense acquisition system 
during the first half of the Clinton administration. 
The model in figure 4 is streamlined, simple and depicts only four phases and four 
decision reviews. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) could and frequently did occur 
before Milestone III in Phase II as a Service Secretary decision. Another key change was 
the very deliberate change in the declaration of Program Initiation moving from 
Milestone 0 (in the 1991 model) to Milestone I. Program Initiation also serves as a 
benchmark of OSD interest in annually reporting to Congress, per 10 USC § 2220(b), the 
average time period between program initiation and Initial Operational Capability (across 
all ACAT I programs of any commodity). In 1994, the average was 115 months.
12
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Figure 4.  Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process
13
 
 
TOWARD CENTRALLIZED CONTROL OF ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The Current 2003 Model: The current 2003 model, in figure 5 below, has five phases and 
six potential decision reviews. The most apparent, and perhaps least significant, change 
between 1990s and 2000s eras was from numerical to alphabetical designation of major 
milestone reviews. Another obvious and important change was the appearance of divided 
phases and within-phase decision and progress reviews. With the latest release of the 
regulatory series, these additional sub-phases or “work efforts,” along with “pre-
acquisition activities” have brought the total number of distinct activity intervals to eight, 
with as many as five phases and six decision reviews – more than at any time past. Each 
of these sub-phase efforts has its own entrance and exit criteria, making them more in 
practice like distinct phases of acquisition. All of the reviews are conducted at the OSD 
level. Newest is the Design Readiness Review, an evolution of the Critical Design 
Review (which had heretofore been a PM-level technical review) in the previous interim 
model -- and prior to that a mid-phase Interim Progress Review. There are several other 
significant implications of this model, regarding placement of the milestones and 
activities, not addressed in this article (Dillard 2003).
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Figure 5.  Defense Acquisition Management Framework
14
 
 
Reviews are described in the current policy to be decision points where decision-
makers can stop, extend or modify the program, or grant permission to proceed into the 
next phase. Program reviews of any kind at the OSD level have a significant impact on 
program management offices. Much documentation must be prepared and many 
preparatory meetings are conducted enroute to the ultimate review. And while non-
milestone reviews are generally considered to be lesser in scope of effort to prepare for, a 
considerable amount of effort managing the decision process is still expended. A six-
month timeline for these activities in preparation of an OSD-level review has been 
unchanged for many years.
15
 It outlines the requirements for meetings and preparatory 
briefings to staff members and committees. Some representatives from program 
management offices keep an accounting of travel and labor costs associated with a 
milestone reviews for an MDAP system. While only anecdotal data was available for this 
research, it is apparent that a substantial amount of program office funding is expended 
on items such as government agency or support contractor assistance with supporting 
analyses and documentation, presentation materials, frequent travel to the Pentagon, and 
other associated expenses in preparation for high-level reviews.
16 
  
With Evolutionary Acquisition as the preferred strategy, notional systems are now 
described in the policy as shorter developments (in SDD) with iterative Milestone B-to-C 
cycles. The new DoDI 5000.2 prescribes that, “In an evolutionary acquisition program, 
the development of each increment shall begin with a Milestone B, and production 
resulting from that increment shall begin with a Milestone C.”
17
 Thus, program managers 
can expect to undergo the management reviews determined appropriate not only for the 
initial increment of development in their program, but also the reviews specified for the 
follow-on increments. The strategy suggests the initiation of low-rate production of an 
80% solution at Milestone C as the preferred approach. So a more accurate depiction of 
the new model, with perhaps only one “spiral” or increment of evolutionary effort, shown 
below in figure 6, presuming the achievement of 100% capability in the same timeframe 
as under the traditional single-step project strategy. The diamond icons represent decision 
reviews. 
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Figure 6. Comparison of 1996 and 2003 Acquisition Framework Models. 
 
What becomes more apparent here is the increased number of actual decision reviews 
required, as well as the concurrent activities involved in managing a separate follow-on 
development increment and its requisite reviews. In fact, the most recent published 
guidance shows an example of a system with two increments of evolution having no less 
than fourteen reviews in its first eleven years from Concept Decision.
18
 Assuming 
advanced development (SDD) for an 80% solution is indeed shortened, and further 
assuming that concept and early prototyping phases are no longer than before, the time 
and effort on control activities appears almost certainly to be disproportionate within the 
same 100% system capability delivery timeline. It seems in the least to be counter to the 
policy espousing decentralized responsibility, innovation and flexibility at the program 
management level. 
On the whole, the 2003 acquisition model prescribes a very new paradigm, and only 
time will inform us whether Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s goals of program 
management flexibility and innovation are achieved. No major program has yet gone 
through the entire model, and none will for many years to come. However, time spent 
“managing the bureaucracy” has long been an encumbrance to PMs.  Back in 1988-89, 
military research fellows studying commercial practices at the Defense Systems 
Management College wrote about an imbalance of authority between PMs and the OSD 
staff.
19
 Of eleven improvements they recommended to the acquisition process, number 
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three on their list was, “Reduce the number and level of program decision milestones.” In 
the context of the 1987 Life Cycle Systems Management Model of five acquisition 
phases and five key decision points, they recommended that only one of these reviews be 
conducted at OSD level: the review for advanced development. They quoted the 1986 
Packard Commission’s conclusions, which said, “He (the PM) should be fully committed 
to abide by the program’s specified baseline and, so long as he does so, the Defense and 
Service Acquisition Executives should support his program and permit him to manage it. 
This arrangement would provide much needed program stability.”
20
 
Mentioned earlier was that contingency theory encourages senior leaders to find the 
best fit for their organization’s structure to its environment, understanding that some 
situations might call for rigid bureaucratic structure while others might require a more 
flexible, organic one. The concept of control is also a cornerstone of cybernetics:  the 
study of organizations, communications and control in complex systems. It focuses on 
looped feedback mechanisms, where the controller communicates to the controlled what 
is the desired future state, and the controlled communicates to the controller information 
with which to form perceptions for use in comparing states. The controller then 
communicates (directs) purposeful behavior (Ashby 1960). 
The fundamental need for communications constrains the options for control, making 
the communications architecture a critically important feature of the control system. It is 
often heard that with communications in today’s information age warfare, we seek to “act 
within the enemy’s decision cycle.” For acquisition decision-makers, the information 
architecture is the command and control hierarchy within our bureaucracy. And the 
decision cycle in the course of a program still, after many years, reflects 180 days of 
typical preparation lead-time for a decision review. This Defense Acquisition Board 
decision cycle appears to be one very important process that has yet to undergo 
transformation. 
Similarly, when Rand authors (Johnson et al. 2003) wrote about DoD decision-
making pertaining to training, equipping, manning, and operating the force, they 
suggested that decisions should be based upon senior leadership’s desired outcomes. 
They acknowledge that with a decentralized management style comes dilution of 
responsibility and accountability, unless vigilance of execution is maintained. But they 
agree with other theorists that centralized decision-making was consistent with the Cold 
War, and a style well suited to the 1960s, that can also be stifling and can restrict 
innovation. 
The Pinchot’s et al. (2003) Intelligent Organization does not call for decentralization 
to undermine bureaucracy, but to improve it. They advocate decentralization with 
horizontal interconnection (a network organization) between business units, to lessen the 
reliance upon going up the chain of command and down again for communication flow 
and decision. Rather than total autonomy for PMs, they support self-management, from 
trust, with responsibility and accountability. This thinking seems particularly appropriate 
to the information age and for a professionalized bureaucracy such as the DoD 
acquisition workforce, with disciplined standards of training, education, and experience 
steadily progressing since implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) in the early 1990s. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is evident that the debate about centralized control and number of OSD-level reviews 
has been taking place for a long time.  The current model increases the number and levels 
of reviews and their placement with regard to program events indicate that we are moving 
toward an even more centralized approach to control of acquisition programs. (A recent 
GAO report calls for even more departmental controls over acquisition than are now in 
place.)
21 
But what is perhaps even more significant than this observation is that moving 
toward greater centralization of control at the higher levels may be a cause for serious 
concern, given predominant management theory cited herein. The mainstream of thought 
indicates that more efficiency and effectiveness might be gained from a different 
approach to an external environment of instability and uncertainty, whether from unclear 
threats and uncertain scenarios, or from complexities of rapidly changing technology and 
systems acquisition. 
Centralization of control is a management issue to be dealt with – the challenge to 
avoid anarchy, with no guidelines or parameters, as well as excessive control. Might 
programs actually be lengthened by more cumbersome reviews? Whether fourteen 
reviews in eleven years are too many is a matter of conjecture and more debate.  
However, it is obvious that there are today more reviews than ever before, and these do 
have a requisite cost associated with their execution. We will likely continue the struggle 
to find the appropriate balance between centralized functions at OSD and autonomy for 
the management of programs in both explicit or implicit management policies and 
frameworks. Further areas of research can perhaps be focused on the effectiveness of 
such reviews, and almost certainly demand that the program costs of centralized decision 
reviews be measured. Another is the area of computational organizational theory, which 
singles out centralization as a project management model input variable that typically 
reduces risk but lengthens overall schedule. Moreover, a study of how the DoD might 
exploit its current capacity via increased horizontal communication might provide insight 
toward attaining the decentralized empowerment it advocates. 
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